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Abstract
This paper documents a dual role for disclosure. In addition to the traditional role of alleviat-
ing information asymmetry, firms are motivated to disclose to attract investors’ limited resources 
and order flow away from other firms (Fishman and Hagerty, 1989). In periods when firms re-
turns comove more with their sector’s returns and thus face more competition for investors, they 
issue more guidance, especially capex guidance. The effect of firm-sector comovement ("sector 
crowdedness") on guidance increases with fiercer competition for investors. Guidance increases 
liquidity and price efficiency (measured as investment sensitivity to price), but the impact of 
guidance decreases in sector crowdedness, consistent with the proposition that more disclosure 
in the crowded sectors is investor-seeking rather than precision increasing. Although the im-
pact of guidance on investment-price sensitivity is lower in more crowded sectors, the effect is 
still positive, suggesting that firms can improve price efficiency by issuing guidance to attract 
informed investors to the firm.
1 Introduction
A substantial literature examines disclosure as a tool firms use to reduce information asymme-
try.1 One set of studies in this literature tests the hypothesis that disclosure will increase a firm’s
liquidity and reduce its cost of capital (e.g. Diamond, 1985; Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991). A
second line of research supposes that if information asymmetry reduction motivates disclosure, then
firms with the greatest information asymmetry problems, or with the greatest incentives to miti-
gate them, will disclose more. Empirical studies have documented a number of firm characteristics
associated with disclosure, assuming disclosure is motivated by incentives to mitigate information
asymmetry, including periods of raising capital (e.g., Lang and Lundholm, 2000), stock-based com-
pensation plans (e.g., Nagar et al., 2003), institutional following and ownership (e.g., Bushee and
Noe, 2000; Ali et al., 2014), corporate governance (Ajinkya et al., 2005), and many others. To-
gether these studies are interpreted as evidence that disclosure is an effective tool firms use to
reduce information asymmetry.
We examine a different motivation for voluntary disclosure choice – competing with other stocks
for limited investor resources. As modelled by Fishman and Hagerty (1989), when investors have
limited resources to study firm disclosures and extract valuable information, they must allocate
their limited resources among stocks. Firms, which are motivated to attract informed investors to
improve price and investment efficiency, can attract informed investors to study them by providing
more precise disclosures than other firms. Fishman and Hagerty (FH) predict a prisoners dilemma-
style equilibrium in which the level of disclosure is greater than the socially optimal disclosure
level. Firms make more disclosures than they would in an unconstrained environment because
they use disclosure not only to reduce information asymmetry but also as a tool to win investors’
limited attentiveness.2 The investor-seeking motive for disclosure, in addition to an information
asymmetry reduction motive, generates novel predictions about when and which firms will disclose
and the consequences of disclosure.
Before discussing our findings, we note that our proxy for disclosure is the issuance of man-
agement guidance. FH model disclosure as an informative signal in the traditional sense that the
1See Beyer et al. (2010) for a review of the literature.
2Attentiveness represents the investor’s conscious choice to spend her limited resources to "attend" to or study a
firm’s disclosures.
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disclosure increases the precision of a trader’s estimate of firm value. As an example, they suggest
that a firm could increase the precision of the signal by improving disclosures within the 10-K. Man-
agement guidance fits the description of a precision-increasing disclosure based on prior research.3
In addition, empirical evidence shows a positive association between the frequency of management
guidance and proxies for financial reporting quality (Ball and Shivakumar, 2008; Ball et al., 2012).
Thus, we use guidance frequency as a proxy for the firm’s overall strategy regarding disclosure
precision.
Our first analysis relates to the question of when and which firms will disclose assuming that
increased disclosure is a tool firms can use to compete for investors. We show that firms that
have greater return comovement with their industry peers ("firm-sector comovement" or greater
"sector crowdedness"), issue more frequent guidance.4 A high degree of firm-sector comovement
suggests that the firm’s economic fundamentals are likely to experience common shocks with its
industry peers which, from investors’ perspectives, increases the substitutability among the stocks.
Information precision becomes a relatively more important factor in an investor’s choice about which
firms to study and ultimately about security selection. This result is consistent with firms viewing
disclosure as having a dual role – reducing information asymmetry and attracting investors who
only study a limited set of firms within a sector.
The correlation between sector crowdedness and forecasting is most economically significant for
capital expenditure forecasts, which we expect contain more firm-specific information that can im-
prove precision. But, the correlation also holds for total guidance, earnings-related guidance, and
sales guidance and for short and long horizon guidance. This result is not driven by firm-level fac-
tors that are potentially correlated with both firm-sector comovement and firm-level management
forecast decisions. The set of control variables we include comes from a recent review article on the
antecedents on forecasting (Hirst et al., 2008) and includes proxies for analyst and investor environ-
ment, information asymmetry, firm performance, litigation risk, and product market competition.
Common shocks to investment at the industry-year level do not explain the higher likelihood of
capex guidance for firms with greater firm-sector comovement.
3See Hirst et al. (2008) for a survey of the literature on consequences of management guidance.
4We refer to the explanatory power of a model of the comovement of a firm’s returns with the returns of other
firms in the sector as "firm-sector comovement." We use the term "return synchronicity" for the explanatory power
of a market model, that regresses a firm’s return on a market index (e.g., Morck et al. (2000)), and possibly other
factors.
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In cross-sectional analysis, we show that firms with the greatest incentives to differentiate them-
selves from the crowd provide more total guidance as sector crowdedness increases. We predict that
the benefits of disclosure in terms of attracting investors are greater for smaller firms with lower
analyst following and for firms that are not in the S&P 500. We also predict that disclosure benefits
are greater for firms that have more volatile variation in institutional holdings, under the assump-
tion that firms value institutional ownership. Based on all four firm-level proxies for incentives to
compete, the sensitivity of disclosure to sector crowdedness is stronger for firms that face greater
exposure to the limits on investors’ resources. We also examine industry-level proxies for incentives
to compete. The guidance decisions of firms are more sensitive to firm-sector comovement in sectors
with high levels of comovement or proportions of firms that comove. This finding is consistent with
our assumption of category investing, which predicts that category investing increases comovement
(Barberis and Shleifer, 2003; Barberis et al., 2005). As investment in a particular category increases,
regardless of what drives the sentiment, firms will disclose to capture a piece of the pie. Also, firms
disclosures are less sensitive to comovement in industries followed by more dedicated investors and
more sensitive to comovement in industries characterized by quasi-indexers. Both the firm-level and
industry-level variation in the disclosure-comovement sensitivity is consistent with the prediction
that competition for investors is a factor in disclosure choice.
We next examine predictions about disclosure consequences assuming that increased disclosure
is a tool firms can use to compete for investors. We first confirm the well-documented association
between management forecasts and liquidity and cost of capital (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Lang
and Maffett, 2011; Balakrishnan et al., 2014). Given our finding of an association between comove-
ment and disclosure, we question whether part of the disclosure-liquidity relation could be driven
by an association between firm-sector comovement and liquidity. Prior literature hypothesizes and
finds a positive association between synchronicity and liquidity because the common information
in price reduces adverse selection costs (Chan et al., 2013; Baruch et al., 2007). We find, however,
that guidance and comovement have independent effects on our three proxies for liquidity. Adding
fixed effects significantly reduces the coefficient estimates, particularly for the effect of management
forecasts on liquidity. Hence, the effect of guidance on liquidity is mainly cross-sectional rather than
time-varying, but sector crowdedness is an important driver of both time-varying within-firm and
cross-sectional liquidity.
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The key finding, however, is that the effect of guidance on liquidity and price efficiency, measured
as the sensitivity of investment to price, decreases with the level of firm-sector comovement. This
evidence is consistent with FH’s proposition that, when firms compete for investors, disclosure is
greater than is needed to increase information precision. The excess disclosure is an optimal strategic
response necessary to attract traders’ limited resources. Thus, the marginal effect of the disclosure
on liquidity and price efficiency is smaller as firm-sector comovement increases.
The finding that sector crowdedness affects guidance decisions provides a new explanation for
the well-documented association between disclosure and liquidity. Both information asymmetry
reduction and competition for investors motivate disclosure. Competition is fiercer when assets are
more substitutable, in which case the driving factor in the investor’s asset selection decision within
the sector is not firm fundamentals, but rather the relative precision of the information about
the fundamentals. Thus, from the firm’s point of view, disclosure serves a dual role. It provides
information, which reduces information asymmetry, but it also provides incentives for more traders
to study and invest in the firm’s stock. Our analysis of liquidity confirms that the disclosures
increase liquidity and price efficiency.
These findings have implications for the learning-from-price literature. Chen et al. (2006), for
example, show that the sensitivity of corporate investment to stock price is higher for firms with
lower firm return synchronicity with market and industry returns. They interpret this result as
evidence of a learning channel, based on the assumption that lower return synchronicity implies
more firm-specific information in price. Thus, Chen et al. (2006) conclude that firms with a weak
information environment have worse price and investment efficiency. Our findings suggest that
higher return synchronicity could mean that the firm’s fundamentals are more correlated with the
sector, reducing adverse selection as in Chan et al. (2013), not that the firm has a weaker information
environment. Moreover, the firm-sector comovement motivates disclosure. Taken together, the
analysis shows that firms can change the investment-price efficiency calculus by issuing guidance
and increasing disclosure precision.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sketches out the FH model and discusses the literature
on return comovement and category investing, which are the building blocks of our proposition.
Section 3 discusses our sample and the model and variable specifications. Sections 4 and 5, respec-
tively, report our analysis of disclosure and sector crowdedness and the capital market consequences
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of disclosure in crowded sectors. Section 6 concludes.
2 Limited Investor Resources and Disclosure
2.1 The Fishman-Hagerty model
Our empirical predictions about sector crowdedness and disclosure follow the logic of the Fish-
man and Hagerty (1989) model, which predicts that competition for limited investor resources
motivates firm-level disclosure. FH model a single market in which firms make an unobservable
investment in a risky asset and provide a signal of the project’s value. Firms have an incentive to
increase price efficiency and hence investment efficiency, which they can accomplish by disclosing a
more precise signal. The firm chooses the disclosure’s precision; greater precision is more costly.
Individual traders can study firms’ disclosures and then trade. Each trader can observe the
signal of one firm costlessly; observing more than one signal is prohibitively costly. The assumption
that observing signals is costly means that traders must incur costs to extract informative signals
from publicly available documents. For example, all traders may be able to see a 10-K document,
but it is costly to observe the informative signal within the 10-K. The assumption that traders study
only one firm is made for mathematical convenience, but the general idea that investors follow a
subset of firms in the market is plausible (Merton, 1987; Barberis and Shleifer, 2003). After traders
observe the signal, trading occurs in a securities market as in Kyle (1985).
FH predict that firms will compete to induce investors to study their disclosures by producing
more precise signals. A more precise disclosure about the project value has two effects: (1) precision
directly increases the precision of the order flow and (2) precision attracts more informed traders to
study the firm. These two effects together lead to a more efficient price for the disclosing firm. A
firm’s precise disclosure creates a negative externality – a less efficient price for firms that provide
less precise disclosures. The result is a prisoners dilemma-style equilibrium in which the level of
disclosure is higher than in settings in which investor resources are less constrained. FH conclude
that firms that are exposed to this type of competition for limited investor resources expend more
resources on disclosure than is socially optimal.
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2.2 Translating the FH model
The FH model assumes that investors make their resource allocation decision across firms in
a single market. The informed traders then trade only the shares of the firm they have studied;
trading other firms is unprofitable. A more realistic version of the stylized FH model assumes that
traders first make a portfolio allocation decision across investment categories and subsequently they
(or their delegated asset managers) select specific securities within the category to study and trade.
This practice – commonly called category investing – can arise optimally with costly information
processing or when investors are subject to information acquisition constraints (Van Nieuwerburgh
and Veldkamp, 2010).5 Peng and Xiong (2006) also offer theoretical support for category investing,
by showing that costly information acquisition and limited investor resources lead to category-
learning behavior.
We focus on sectors as an investment category. Peng and Xiong (2006) suggest industry as a
category that investors could want to learn about. Firms in the same industry are more likely to be
subject to common shocks because they use similar inputs and produce similar outputs. Evidence
suggests that analysts tend to concentrate on certain industries (O’Brien, 1990; Dunn and Nathan,
2005). Analyst concentration consolidates the learning of common information (Veldkamp, 2006),
but leaves open the need for firm-level disclosures to analysts who can study and understand them.
Empirically, we observe category investing by industry. As of December 31, 2016, there were 356
sector funds with total net asset value of 360 billion dollars.
Assuming investors engage in sector investing, firms will consider their industry peers to be the
set of firms they compete against for investors’ limited resources through increased disclosure.6 The
more substitutable the assets in a sector, the more important disclosure precision will be to the
investor’s security selection within the category. Without substitutability, fundamentals are a clear
driver of asset selection. With substitutability, investors will choose between otherwise "identical"
stocks based on information precision. This proposal implies a time-varying measure of similarity
with other firms in the sector to capture the notion of fiercer competition. As the substitutability
5Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2010) predict that this sort of information gathering will lead to under-
diversified portfolios.
6Minton and Schrand (2016) predict that firms appeal to investors by remaining exposed to a common factor that
is an attractive investment index, such as gold or oil prices. Remaining exposed to a factor by not hedging it is a
costly real activity. A credible disclosure policy is an alternative.
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increases, the firm will engage in strategies to increase disclosure precision and attract investors.
2.3 Empirical predictions
The first testable prediction is that firms that face more crowded sector conditions – with highly
substitutable assets – will disclose more. To capture within-sector asset substitutability, we use a
time-varying firm-level measure of the comovement of a stock’s returns with the average returns of
stocks in the firm’s sector ("firm-sector comovement"). Higher firm-sector comovement indicates
greater correlation among the underlying economic fundamentals, which increases the substitutabil-
ity of the stocks. Including year-quarter and firm fixed effects and other documented determinants
of disclosure in the model mitigates concerns about omitted variables that are correlated with both
disclosure and firm-sector comovement. Our model explains the within-firm response of disclosure
to time-varying comovement.
Our comovement measure is distinct from typical return synchronicity measures used in prior
literature. Typically, even studies that examine industry comovement measure the R2 of a two-
factor market model that includes industry returns. Our R2 is based on a model that does not
include the market index. This measure is consistent with our assumption that investors engage in
sector investing, thus the correlation of returns with the market is unrelated to the choice of assets
within the sector. This measure is a proxy for correlated fundamentals within the sector.
Although we use firm-sector comovement as a proxy for correlated fundamentals, it is correlated
with return synchronicity and we recognize the possibility that higher return comovement could be
correlated with the amount of firm-specific information in price. There are two schools of thought
on a possible correlation between return synchronicity and the extent of private information in
price. The first is that return comovement represents a weaker information environment and less
firm-specific information in price. This idea is common in the literature,7 particularly related to
cross-country or industry synchronicity, with studies primarily citing empirical evidence in Morck
et al. (2000). For clarification, Morck et al. (2000) examines variation in country-level measures
of synchronicity. They show that cross-country variation in synchronicity is not explained by their
country-level measure of synchronous fundamentals – a country-level index for comovement of ROA
– but it is associated with country-level measures of a weak information environment. Since the
7See the discussion in Li et al. (2014).
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publication of Morck et al. (2000), studies have assumed that return synchronicity is negatively
correlated the amount of firm-specific information in price, not just in cross-country studies, but
also in studies within the U.S that compute firm-level measures of synchronicity with the market
or an industry factor. In the context of disclosure, Haggard et al. (2008) document a negative
concurrent association between return synchronicity and disclosure rankings, concluding that better
disclosure increases the amount of firm-specific information in price. Hutton et al. (2009) find that
firms with more opaque financial statements, measured by greater abnormal accruals, have higher
R2s in a two factor market model with an industry factor. The effect ends after the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act (SOX) in 2002. They attribute the cessation of guidance to greater monitoring such that the
abnormal accruals measure no longer captures opacity. Recently, the generalizability of the Morck
et al. (2000) findings have been questioned for cross-country synchronicity (Alves et al., 2010) and
synchronicity in general (Li et al., 2014)). Alves et al. (2010) suggests that the results are specific
to 1995, the only year of analysis in Morck et al. (2000). Subsequent literature largely ignores the
idea that correlated fundamentals would also generate return synchronicity, although prominent as
an alternative in Morck et al. (2000).
Overall, while there is theoretical support for the idea that synchronicity implies a weak informa-
tion environment, studies subsequent to Morck et al. (2000) suggest that our firm-sector measure
of comovement is unlikely to reflect a weaker information environment. In addition, we provide
descriptive and anecdotal evidence consistent with our interpretation of firm-sector comovement as
a measure of correlated fundamentals. The types of industries with higher comovement on average
have a common commodity factor such as gold or oil (see Figure 1). In addition, we find that firms
in more crowded sectors have higher liquidity, analyst following, and institutional ownership, all
characteristics of a stronger, not weaker, information environment. Finally, our results hold despite
controls for a weak information environment in all of the models.
A second school of thought suggests that comovement represents greater transparency and more
private information in price, opposite to the first school. One theory is that comovement implies that
price contains more public and easily observable information for the market maker (Baruch et al.,
2007). The commonality reduces adverse selection costs and results in higher volume and liquidity.8
8Dasgupta et al. (2010) suggest another possibility. For more transparent firms, price better reflects information
about the future. More informative current prices imply fewer surprises in subsequent periods, which implies greater
return synchronicity as measured by R2.
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Empirical evidence is consistent with the idea that synchronicity implies more common information
in price. If higher comovement implies more information in price, then using comovement as a proxy
for substitutability biases the tests against our hypothesis as firms in more crowded sectors would
not need to disclose; they could free ride on the information in peer firm disclosures as in Baginski
and Hinson (2016).9 Nonetheless, in robustness tests, we include lagged peer disclosures and firm
fixed effects in the model to proxy for external information. All results, including the cross-sectional
results, are robust to this specification.
Our proxies for disclosure are various measures related to the existence and frequency of man-
agement guidance. The premise behind these proxies is that information precision is higher when a
management forecast is provided, and when more forecasts are provided, than when no forecast is
provided. These measures are basic, but there is substantial evidence that forecasts on average can
provide information (Hirst et al., 2008). In addition, Ball and Shivakumar (2008) and Ball et al.
(2012) provide evidence that guidance frequency is correlated with earnings quality metrics and
audit fees. Thus, guidance is one of a number of correlated choices that reflect greater precision in
financial reporting overall.
Throughout the analysis, we examine capital expenditure forecasts separately from sales or
earnings forecasts. We expect capital expenditure forecasts to contain relatively more firm-specific
information that can differentiate the firm from its peers than earnings forecasts on average. Earn-
ings reflects both firm-specific news and common macroeconomic or industry trends, and the latter
is easily accessible from public information. For example, an earnings announcement by a gold firm
aggregates information about gold prices with information about the firm’s business model as it
relates to gold production or distribution. The gold price component is public knowledge and does
not require costly study by investors. Hence, sales and earnings forecasts are expected to provide
the sort of precision investors can profit from only if the growth in sales or earnings is abnormal
relative to an overall trend for the firm or sector. Capital expenditure forecasts, by contrast, are
more likely to contain information that increases precision and attracts investors to study the firm.
Prior research suggests that disclosures of future capital expenditures are a relevant signal of firm
value and managerial reputation (e.g., McConnell and Muscarella, 1985; Hirshleifer, 1993; Chung
9Baginski and Hinson (2016) show that when a firm stops issuing guidance, firms in the same industry that were
"free riding" on the common information increase forecasting activity, which affects their cost of capital.
9
et al., 2001; Brailsford and Yeoh, 2004).
We provide evidence on sector crowdedness, measured by firm-sector comovement, as an an-
tecedent of disclosure choice, measured by guidance issuance, in three steps. Our first analysis
establishes the positive temporal correlation between sector crowdedness and subsequent quarter
management guidance decisions, in general, and for capex guidance in particular. Second, we con-
sider alternative explanations for the positive association between sector crowdedness and disclosure
and attempt to rule them out through robustness and falsification tests. Finally, we show predictable
covariation in the disclosure-crowdedness relation. We predict that the influence of sector crowd-
edness on disclosure will be strongest for smaller firms with lower analyst following, who are less
studied. At the firm level, we also predict that disclosures of firms with more variable institutional
ownership and those that are not in the S&P 500 will be more sensitive to sector crowdedness. At the
industry level, we predict that the guidance of firms in sectors with higher comovement on average
and with a greater proportion of competing firms will be more sensitive to crowdedness, following
the predictions of Barberis et al. (2005). Their analysis shows that correlated fund flows into a style,
which could be a sector, lead to greater comovement in asset prices within the style. This result
implies that the overall industry-level of comovement will increase the competition for investors.
Our model includes firm-sector comovement as a main effect and also conditions on industry-wide
comovement, which represents a bigger pie that firms are competing for with the other stocks in the
same sector. Finally, we predict that the effect will be stronger for firms that rely on quasi-indexers
that choose to trade a subset of available securities from the sector they are tracking.
We next examine disclosure consequences. Although the proposition that firms are motivated to
disclose to compete for limited investor resources predicts excessive disclosure – more than is socially
optimal – the guidance nonetheless increases liquidity and price efficiency. As recognized in the FH
model, disclosure serves the dual role of increasing liquidity and price efficiency by attracting more
informed investors and by reducing information asymmetry. Increasing liquidity and price efficiency
are also predicted if information asymmetry alone motivates disclosure. The motives of information
asymmetry reduction and investor-seeking are not mutually exclusive.
To distinguish whether investor-seeking is an incremental factor in disclosure choice beyond the
objective to reduce information asymmetry, we estimate the marginal effect of disclosure on liquidity
and price efficiency as sector crowdedness increases. FH propose that firms facing limited investor
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resources disclose more than they would disclose in an unconstrained environment. Since some of
the disclosure in a crowded sector is excessive, disclosure improves liquidity and price efficiency less
in more crowded sectors. In less crowded sectors, firms have incentives to disclose only to reduce
information asymmetry. This proposition implies that the marginal unit of disclosure will impact
liquidity and price efficiency less when disclosure is motivated by investor-seeking, that is when
firm-sector comovement is higher. Our analysis models liquidity and price efficiency as a function
of guidance, consistent with the existing literature, and also includes an interaction term between
guidance and firm-sector comovement.
3 Model and Variable Specifications
To test the association between sector crowdedness and firm-level guidance decisions, we estimate
OLS models of the existence and frequency of management forecasts by firm i in quarter q on firm-
sector comovement of firm i in quarter q − 1 (Comoveiq−1) as follows:
Yiq = α0 + α1Comoveiq−1 + Γ′cControlsiq−1 + iq, (1)
where the dependent variable is one of several firm-quarter forecast measures described below.
We lag firm-sector comovement by one quarter to control for the possibility that forecast issuance
can reversely cause changes in comovement. Γc is a vector of coefficient estimates on the control
variables. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
As a benchmark, we estimate the model without fixed effects. Throughout the paper, the
primary specification includes control variables (raw and industry-adjusted as described below),
firm fixed effects, and fixed time (year-quarter) effects to control for time trends in comovement and
disclosure.
3.1 Management forecasts
Our dependent variables are the existence and frequency of different types of management fore-
casts. We obtain management forecasts issued between January 2003 and December 2016 from
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I/B/E/S Guidance.10 We choose 2003 as the start year because I/B/E/S started collecting guid-
ance data in 2003.
We assign management forecasts from I/B/E/S Guidance into each quarter by comparing the
forecast announcement dates with firms’ fiscal quarter end dates from the Compustat Quarterly File.
Following Anilowski et al. (2007), we exclude forecasts issued just after the firm’s corresponding
fiscal quarter end date because these forecasts are likely to be pre-announcements of quarterly
results instead of informative guidance. The dataset includes forecasts of all types (e.g., mainly
earnings, sales, capital expenditures), horizons (forecasts for the forthcoming and future quarters),
and frequency (annual and quarterly).
We construct the following forecast variables. The existence of management forecasts (Guide)
equals one if management issues at least one forecast between the previous quarter end date and
the current quarter end date. The number of management forecasts (Num Guide) is the natural
logarithm of one plus the total number of forecasts issued between the previous quarter end date
and the current quarter end date. Capex Fcst is the existence of at least one capital expenditure
forecast, and Num Capex Fcst is the natural logarithm of the number of capital expenditure
forecasts. Capital expenditure forecasts are conceptually closer to the notion of a signal in Fishman
and Hagerty (1989) that, if studied in the context of the firm’s full set of available information, can
increase the precision of an investor’s estimate of firm value. We also compute the natural logarithm
of one plus the total number of unique types of forecasts (Num Fcst Types). In addition, we present
the main results separately for forecasts with a horizon longer than a year (Long Horizon), forecasts
for the next quarter (Short Horizon), and sales forecasts (Sales Fcst).
3.2 Firm-sector return comovement
We operationalize the concept of sector crowdedness with a firm-quarter measure of a stock’s
return comovement with other firm’s returns in the same industry. This measure captures asset
substitutability by measuring the degree to which the stocks in a sector have similar responses to
10Chuk et al. (2013) question the validity of classifying firm disclosure decisions using CIG (Company Issued
Guidance) data and find that CIG does not correctly record the frequency of guidance. The data from I/B/E/S
Guidance is an upgrade from CIG. The likelihood of guidance using I/B/E/S Guidance is similar to the hand-collected
sample of Chuk et al. (2013).
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common shocks. We estimate the model using daily stock returns for firm i in quarter q as follows:
Retiqt = αiq + βiq,−1IndRetjqt−1 + βiq,0IndRetjqt + βiq1IndRetjqt+1 + iqt,
where Retiqt is the daily stock return of firm i on day t of quarter q and IndRetjqt is the value-
weighted stock return of industry j on day t of quarter q, excluding firm i’s own stock return. Leads
and lags of IndRet are included to control for potential infrequent trading bias. The regression
requires a minimum of 50 daily stock return observations for a firm quarter. Firm-sector comovement
is:
Comoveiq = log(1 +
Riq
2
1−Riq2
),
where Riq2 is the adjusted R squared of each regression. A higher comovement value means that a
firm’s stock return is more correlated with the industry returns. Comoveiq is set to zero whenever
the adjusted R squared is negative, which is equivalent to negligible predictive value of the regression.
3.3 Control variables
Our regression models include control variables for factors that prior research has determined
are associated with disclosure choice. We draw the most comprehensive list based on a recent
review of the guidance literature (Hirst et al., 2008), and we follow their framework to classify the
determinants of management forecast decisions into forecast environment variables and forecaster
characteristics. We construct these variables using data from the Compustat Quarterly File, CRSP,
and I/B/E/S Detail History.
3.3.1 Forecast environments
In Hirst et al. (2008) the forecast environment includes the regulatory environment as well as the
firm’s analyst and investor environment. Because our sample starts after Regulation FD and SOX,
the regulatory environment stays relatively stable. Nevertheless, we include calendar year-quarter
fixed effects to control for common trends (Lang et al., 2012).
The model includes controls for analyst following and institutional ownership. Prior studies
find a positive association between analyst following and institutional ownership and the existence
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and frequency of management forecasts (e.g. Healy et al., 1999; Bushee and Noe, 2000; Ajinkya
et al., 2005). Following Ajinkya et al. (2005), we measure analyst following (Analyst following)
as the number of analysts that make a forecast for firm i during quarter q − 1, and institutional
ownership (Inst holdings) as the percentage of institutional ownership of firm i during quarter
q − 1. Controlling for these variables reduces an omitted correlated variable bias given that prior
literature also finds an association between return synchronicity and institutional ownership and
analyst following (Piotroski and Roulstone, 2004; Chan and Hameed, 2006; An and Zhang, 2013;
Hameed et al., 2015; Israelsen, 2016).11
3.3.2 Forecaster characteristics
Forecaster characteristics include information asymmetry, pre-commitment to forecasts, litiga-
tion risk, managerial incentives, prior forecasting behavior, and proprietary costs including product
market competition (Hirst et al., 2008).
Information asymmetry. Information asymmetry reduction is the commonly explored mo-
tive for voluntary disclosure, with the predicted consequence being higher liquidity (e.g., Diamond
(1985), Diamond and Verrecchia (1991)). Empirical evidence finds that higher information asym-
metry is positively associated with the likelihood of guidance (Coller and Yohn, 1997; Balakrishnan
et al., 2014; Billings et al., 2015).12 The information asymmetry motive is not one that we attempt
to rule out, but rather one that co-exists with the investor-seeking motive for issuing guidance.
We control for information asymmetry in the model so that we can measure the incremental ex-
planatory effect of sector crowdedness on guidance. We use return volatility (Return volatility) of
the previous quarter to capture a firm’s information environment (Nagar et al., 2003; Chen et al.,
2011a). We also control for the market to book ratio (Market− to− book) and leverage (Leverage)
at q−1 to account for information asymmetry that arises from firms’ growth opportunities (Bamber
and Cheon, 1995; Ajinkya et al., 2005).
Pre-commitment to forecasts. One factor that leads to more frequent/regular forecasts is
firm performance. Miller (2002), Chen et al. (2011a), and Houston et al. (2010) document a positive
11Veldkamp (2006) predicts that the existence of information markets in which investors pay for analysis will lead
to higher return synchronicity when the cost of information is fixed. Investors purchase information with valuation
implications for multiple firms.
12Waymire (1985), for an earlier time period, found a lower likelihood of management forecasts as information
asymmetry increases, which he attributes to the difficulty of forecasting.
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relation between the likelihood of disclosure and performance. We measure firm performance using
return on assets (ROA) of firm i in quarter q − 1 and we include an indicator variable if quarter
q−1 is a loss quarter (Loss). We also control for earnings surprise (EarningsSurprise), consistent
with prior research showing that firms’ discretionary disclosure decisions are associated with the
size of an earnings surprise (Kasznik and Lev, 1995).
Litigation risk. A large literature documents a positive relation between management forecast
decisions and litigation risk (e.g., Skinner, 1994; Field et al., 2005). Hirst et al. (2008) identify four
factors that affect litigation risk: “(1) firm size, (2) variability of returns, (3) impending negative
news that leads to a large drop in stock price, and (4) industry membership.” We control for firm
size (Size) using one plus the natural logarithm of the total assets of quarter q−1 (Feng and Koch,
2010). Variability of returns and news are controlled for by return volatility and firm performance,
respectively. Industry membership is implicitly controlled for by including firm fixed effects. We do
not additionally control for impending negative news; we expect our other control variables such as
ROA and earnings surprise and the fixed effects are adequate.
Product market competition. Studies find mixed evidence on measures of product market
competition and guidance. Rogers and Stocken (2005) find that firms in more concentrated indus-
tries (a proxy for proprietary costs) issue more pessimistic forecasts to deter entry. Wang (2007)
finds that R&D expenditure scaled by total assets is negatively related to the likelihood of manage-
ment forecast decisions. Ajinkya et al. (2005), however, find no relation between a firm’s forecast
decisions and proprietary costs, proxied by the market-to-book ratio. Li (2010) argues that the ef-
fect of competition on disclosure depends on the nature of the competition. She finds that existing
rivals decrease guidance but potential entrants increase it. The model includes the market-to-book
ratio, a proxy for a firm’s growth opportunities, to capture the time-varying element of proprietary
costs. In untabulated analysis, we find that our results are robust to the inclusion of an industry
Herfindahl index as an alternative measure of proprietary costs that arise from product market
competition.
Managerial incentives. Studies document that equity based compensation affects the likeli-
hood of forecasting because it increases managers’ incentives to boost short-term stock price (e.g.
Nagar et al., 2003). Despite the potential relevance to disclosure, there is no evidence that com-
pensation is related to return synchronicity or intra-industry comovement, which would necessitate
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including control variables for incentives as control variables. Moreover, managerial incentives are
driven by firm news and the information environment, which are captured by our existing control
variables, such as firm performance (ROA and Loss), firm size, return volatility, and the fixed
effects (Nagar et al., 2003; Aboody et al., 2005). We therefore do not control for managers’ equity
based compensation directly.
Prior forecast behavior. Hirst et al. (2008) define prior forecast behavior as historical forecast
accuracy and tendency to meet or beat analyst forecasts. We do not control for historical forecast
accuracy because computing historical forecast accuracy requires firms to have issued forecasts in
the past, which will impose a selection bias. We believe our overall controls for the information
environment and the fixed effects are adequate.
3.4 Descriptive statistics
Our sample consists of 183,884 firm-quarter observations from 2003 to 2016 with non-missing
variables. The sample excludes firms in the utility and financial services industries. We obtain
management forecast data from I/B/E/S Guidance. Financial variables are from Compustat and
CRSP.
Table 1 summarizes the distribution of the variables used in our empirical analysis. As reported
in Panel A, average firm-sector comovement is 0.28 with a standard deviation 0.33, which suggests
sufficient variation for the empirical analysis. Approximately 49% of firm-quarter observations in
our sample issue some form of management forecast. Earnings forecasts are the most common type
(34%), followed by sales forecasts (31%) and capital expenditure forecasts (20%). Short horizon
forecasts (i.e., for the next quarter) are more common than forecasts with a horizon longer than a
year (33% vs. 2.7%).
[Insert Table 1]
Table 1 Panels B through E report summary statistics for other variables used throughout the
analysis. Raw control variables (Panel B) are adjusted by their industry and year averages (Panel
C). Industry-adjusting occurs before we exclude observations with missing data from the sample,
thus the sample averages of the industry-by-year adjusted variables can differ from zero. All control
variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%.
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Table 2 presents averages for the guidance, liquidity, and control variables by comovement
decile.13 The likelihood of providing a management forecast increases monotonically as the comove-
ment of the firm’s return with its industry peers increases. This univariate pattern is consistent
with our proposition that sector crowdedness motivates disclosure. Our various measures of liquid-
ity (zero return days, bid-ask spread, and Amihud illiquidity) have been multiplied by -1 so that a
smaller negative amount represents higher liquidity. All three measures increase monotonically in
firm-sector comovement, consistent with Baruch et al. (2007) and Li et al. (2014).
[Insert Table 2]
The univariate patterns are useful for assessing Comoveiq as a proxy for correlated fundamentals
(i.e., asset substitutability) that would drive firms to compete for investors. The analysis also
provides evidence to assess whether comovement is positively related to information asymmetry as
in Morck et al. (2000) or positively related to information transparency and lower adverse selection
as described in Chan et al. (2013) and Baruch et al. (2007). The results offer suggestive evidence
that, if anything, comovement is related to a better firm information environment, instead of a lack
of firm-specific information in price. For the control variables, larger, better-performing and less
volatile firms, and firms with higher institutional ownership and analyst following have higher firm-
sector comovement. These patterns are inconsistent with comovement as an inverse measure of firm-
specific information in price. The patterns are consistent with studies that show that comovement
of asset returns can attract more informative order flows and increase liquidity. These variables
are included as controls in the disclosure model given their relations with both comovement and
disclosure. Hence, we interpret an effect of comovement on guidance as incremental to the effect of
information asymmetry.
Figure 1 plots the distribution of firm-sector comovement across one-digit SIC industries ex-
cluding the financial service and utility industries. Consistent with Minton and Schrand (2016), we
find that mining and construction industries have the highest median comovement (SIC=1). Min-
ing and construction industries are subject to common economic shocks such as commodity price
movements. The descriptive evidence is consistent with our interpretation that Comove proxies for
correlated economic fundamentals.
13Because return comovement = 0 for greater than 10% of the observations, we combine observations in the first
and second deciles.
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[Insert Figure 1]
Table 3 is a quarter-to-quarter transition matrix of Comove, which shows the persistence of firm-
sector comovement. The columns represent comovement deciles in quarter q and the rows represent
comovement deciles in quarter q− 1. Twenty percent of the observations appear in decile 1 because
greater than ten percent of the observations had comovement measures that were indistinguishable
from zero. Each cell contains (1) the number of observations in a particular comovement decile
combination (top) and (2) the percentage of observations in a particular comovement decile in
quarter q among all the observations in the comovement decile in quarter q− 1 (bottom). The sum
of the percentages in each row is 100. The higher percentages (or number of observations) in the
diagonal line indicate that quarterly firm-sector comovement is persistent. However, time variation
exists, which can be seen from the off-diagonal elements. The time variation allows us to identify
the effects of a crowded sector using a within-firm specification, which helps to mitigate concerns
about various omitted correlated variables.
[Insert Table 3]
4 Results: Disclosure Choice
We first examine the association between sector crowdedness, proxied by Comove, and the
likelihood and frequency of management forecasts in Section 4.1. In Section 4.2, we explore several
alternative explanations for the results. In Section 4.3, we analyze cross-sectional variation in the
sensitivity of disclosure to comovement as a function of firm and industry-level factors that vary
exposure to competition for limited investor resources.
4.1 Forecast likelihood and frequency
Table 4 Panel A documents the effects of firm-sector comovement in quarter q − 1 on the
likelihood and frequency of management forecasts in quarter q using model (1). Columns (1)-(4)
report results using the existence of management forecasts in quarter q as the dependent variable
and different combinations of fixed effects and control variables. Standard errors are clustered by
firm for all specifications.
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The coefficient estimate on Comove in column (1) is 0.417. Including firm and year-quarter fixed
effects and control variables decreases the coefficient to 0.048 in the model with control variables
(column 3), and 0.051 in the model with raw and industry-adjusted control variables (column 4),
both statistically significant. Because we include firm fixed effects, it is not surprising that adding
industry-adjusted control variables has little impact on the coefficient estimates or significance levels.
We use the model with industry-year-adjusted control variables (plus raw control variables and firm
and year-quarter fixed effects) as our main specification going forward. Based on the coefficient
estimate from column (4), a one standard deviation increase in comovement (0.33) is associated
with 1.68 percentage point (0.33*0.051) higher probability of issuing a management forecast. The
economic magnitude is small relative to the unconditional likelihood of management forecasts (0.49).
Column (5) reports results using the natural logarithm of the total number of management
forecasts in quarter q as the dependent variable and includes the full set of raw and industry-adjusted
control variables and fixed effects. A one standard deviation increase in firm-sector comovement
(0.33) is associated with a 2% (0.33*0.06) increase in the number of management forecasts.
[Insert Table 4 ]
Panel B models capital expenditure forecasts. Both the likelihood and number of capital expen-
diture forecasts increase with sector crowdedness. A one standard deviation increase in comovement
is associated with a 1.81 percentage point increase in the likelihood of issuing capital expenditure
forecasts. Given the unconditional likelihood of 20%, the effect of comovement on capital expen-
diture forecasts is more dramatic than for total forecasts. A one standard deviation increase in
comovement is associated with a 1.49% increase in the number of capital expenditure forecasts
(column 5).
Table 4 Panel C reports results for the other forecast variables. Column (1) shows that the
likelihood of EPS forecasts responds less to changes in comovement than does the likelihood of capex
forecasts. A one standard deviation increase in comovement is associated with a 0.83 percentage
point increase in the likelihood of an EPS forecast. The economic magnitude is small relative to
the unconditional likelihood of 34%. Similarly, a one standard deviation increase in comovement is
associated with a 1.1 percentage point increase in sales forecasts, again a small effect compared to
capital expenditure forecasts and the unconditional likelihood of 31%. The relative strength of the
economic effect of sector crowdedness on capital expenditure forecasts compared to EPS and sales
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forecasts is consistent with our conjecture that capital expenditure forecasts are the most likely to
increase the precision of traders’ estimates of value in the sense of Fishman and Hagerty (1989).
Columns (3) and (4) show that the results hold for both long and short horizon forecasts. This
result sheds light on the difference between our findings and those in Gong et al. (2013). They
document that firms with less earnings synchronicity issue more long term guidance. At first their
findings seem to contradict our findings, as we predict and find that firms with higher comovement
issue more forecasts. Their result holds only for long horizon forecasts, which are a small element of
total forecasting behavior. In addition, instead of return synchronicity, they examine earnings (non)
synchronicity, which is measured using earnings before extraordinary items. Nonrecurring items are
included in their earnings measure. Thus, their earnings synchronicity measure could be capturing
firm quarters with large negative one-time items, which motivate the firm to issue a long horizon
forecast based on only the persistent component of earnings. Gong et al. (2013) do not separately
examine capital expenditure forecasts.
The signs on the control variables are consistent with reported patterns in prior studies. Better
performance (based on ROA and Loss), lower return volatility, higher growth, greater analyst
following and institutional ownership, and better news are associated with a higher likelihood and
number of management forecasts. When using capital expenditure forecasts as the dependent
variable, loadings on the control variables are similar except that the loadings on firm performance,
return volatility, and earnings surprise are not significant.
4.2 Alternative explanations and robustness tests
The finding that capital expenditure forecasts are increasing in firm-sector comovement could
be explained by a correlation between comovement and actual capital expenditures. That is, high-
comovement firms could have greater capital expenditures on average to issue guidance about. We
examine this possible confounding effect by estimating equation (1) controlling for the level of
capex, where capex is defined as capital expenditure scaled by lagged total assets. The coefficient
on comovement remains similar (untabulated).
A second alternative explanation we consider is that industries with higher comovement also have
lower proprietary costs of disclosure. Our results are robust to controlling for firm, year-quarter,
and industry-by-quarter fixed effects. To the extent that the level of competition is mainly cross-
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sectional, the fixed effects structure mitigates the competition explanation. In addition, our results
are robust to controlling for product market competition, measured using an industry Herfindahl
index (untabulated). Finally, this argument likely applies more to capital expenditure forecasts
than to forecasts of earnings that will be released in the forthcoming financial reports within a
quarter at most. Our results are concentrated in capital expenditure forecasts, where we expect the
proprietary costs to be higher, which is not consistent with this argument.
Finally, in untabulated analysis, we estimate the regressions with lagged peer firm disclosures.
Disclosure by a peer firm could inform investors about the firm’s private information endowment,
which affects traders’ beliefs about the non-disclosing firm and results in return comovement. We
find that the comovement-guidance association is incremental to the effects of lagged peer disclo-
sures.14
One potential concern in our model specification is that the panel data analysis hides the effects
of a few major shocks to high comovement industries, and the firms’ correlated responses to the shock
drive the results. The model includes industry-adjusted control variables, which should mitigate
this concern. In addition, we estimate the model including industry-by-year fixed effects, which
absorb time varying industry specific shocks, and find similar results (untabulated). Finally, we
estimate the model by year. The untabulated results for Capex Fcst are positive and significant
beginning in 2005 (not 2003 or 2004) and remain significant through 2016.15 The results for Guide
are significant and positive in 2008 - 2016. The consistency of the results across the years also helps
to alleviate concerns about asymmetric synchronicity, which has been documented to be higher
during down markets compared to bull markets (e.g., Ang and Chen, 2002).
4.3 Predictable cross-sectional variation
In the FH model, all firms are identically motivated to compete for informed investors to improve
price efficiency. In reality, firms face varying incentives to disclose and attract the limited resources
of investors. We separately examine firm characteristics and industry characteristics that affect the
incentives of firms in a crowded sector to differentiate themselves from their peers in the following
sections.
14The cross-sectional tests in the next section are also robust to inclusion of lagged peer firm guidance.
15Two studies note a disruption to guidance practice in 2003 following Coca Cola’s announcement that it would
stop issuing earnings guidance (Chen et al., 2011b; Houston et al., 2010).
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4.3.1 Firm characteristics
We predict that larger firms and firms with greater analyst following have less incentive to
disclose to attract investors. Because greater amounts of accessible information are generated about
these firms by external parties, investors have greater incentives to study larger, well-followed firms
within a sector relative to their smaller and less-followed peers. Even absent disclosure by the
firm, the cost of studying these firms is lower. Assuming disclosure is costly, larger, well-followed
firms will have less incentive to use guidance to compete for investors. We predict a smaller cross-
sectional effect of size and analyst following on the sensitivity of capex guidance to crowdedness,
assuming that capex guidance provides more unique information than earnings guidance. Hence,
their disclosure decisions are expected to be less responsive to sector crowdedness.
The next two firm-level cross-sectional variables capture the firm’s exposure to competition for
investors. First, we measure the within-firm variation in the percentage of institutional ownership
(Inst SD). Greater volatility of institutional ownership should imply more exposure to competition
for investors, and we expect the disclosure decisions of firms with greater Inst SD to be more
sensitive to sector crowdedness. Second, firms that are in the S&P 500 have lower incentives to use
costly disclosure to attract investors. The evidence in Barberis et al. (2005) suggests that investors
view stocks in the S&P 500 as an investment category,16 hence firms in the index have less need
to attract more investors and their disclosure decisions are expected to be less responsive to sector
crowdedness.
Table 5 presents cross-sectional results conditional on industry-year firm size and analyst fol-
lowing; the within-firm standard deviation of institutional ownership; and S&P 500 index inclusion.
We predict a negative coefficient estimate on the interaction of Comove with firm size, analyst
following, and S&P 500 inclusion since such firms are less motivated to use disclosure as a tool to
compete for investors, and a positive coefficient estimate on the interaction of Comove with the
16Barberis et al. (2005) examine the comovement between a stock’s return and the S&P 500 return after the stock’s
inclusion in the index. They find a significant increase in the stock’s beta. Given that fundamentals are unlikely to
change upon index inclusion, they interpret their findings as evidence that sentiment-driven demand for a particular
habitat (i.e., the S&P 500) explains a stock’s comovement with the stock’s category. Their results are consistent
with category investing, as assumed in our analysis. Although they claim that their findings "...cannot easily be
explained by the fundamentals-based view of comovement", their evidence on S&P 500 index inclusions does not
provide evidence – either for or against – on our firm-sector comovement measure as a proxy for asset substitutability
within a sector.
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within-firm standard deviation of institutional ownership.17 Columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) report
the regression results using Guide as the dependent variable; columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) report
results for Capex Fcst. The models include raw and industry-adjusted control variables and firm
and calendar year-quarter fixed effects. The interaction terms in all cases have the predicted signs
and are statistically significant: when firms are smaller, with fewer analysts, not in the S&P 500, or
with high time-varying institutional holdings, their disclosures are more sensitive to sector crowd-
edness. These firm characteristics moderate the effect of return comovement on a firm’s guidance
decision. In all cases, incentives to compete play less of a moderating role for capital expenditure
forecasts.
[Insert Table 5]
4.3.2 Industry characteristics
Our second set of cross-sectional predictions conditions on industry-level characteristics. We
first predict that firms in industries with higher comovement are more exposed to competition for
investors. We use two variables to measure industry-level comovement. High Comove SIC is an
indicator variable equal to one if the median comovement of a two-digit SIC industry is in the
upper quartile for all two-digit SIC industries, and zero otherwise. % High Comove is a time-
varying measure of industry-level comovement that equals the percentage of firms in a two-digit
SIC industry-quarter whose comovement is higher than the median comovement of the full sample.
[Insert Table 6]
Table 6 columns (1) through (4) present the results. For both measures of the absolute magnitude
of industry-level comovement, the interaction term is positive and significant.18 These results are
consistent with our proposition that the effect of comovement on disclosure is related to competition
for investors, which becomes more fierce as sector crowdedness increases.
We also examine exposure to competition for investors using classifications based on observed
trading activity (Bushee, 1998): dedicated owners, quasi-indexers, and transient investors. Dedi-
17For columns (1) through (4), the main effect (firm size or analyst following) is included with the control variables,
as described previously. For columns (5) and (6), the main effect is redundant with the firm fixed effects and is excluded
from the model.
18The main effect of Comove is negative in column (4). This coefficient represents the case in which% High Comove
= 0, which is less than the 1st percentile (see Table 1, Panel D). The main effect therefore reflects an extreme case
and should not be interpreted alone.
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cated owners have large, long-term holdings, concentrated in a small number of firms, and are more
likely to gather private information about a firm and directly monitor its managers. Quasi-indexers
tend not to rely heavily on private information and adopt a passive monitoring style. Transient in-
vestors hold small stakes in many firms and trade frequently on publicly available information, but
they do not generally acquire private information. We assume that quasi-indexers are most likely
to behave as category investors, choosing to study and trade a subset of stocks within a particular
sector. Hence, we predict that firms in industries with high percentages of quasi-indexers are the
most likely to use disclosure to compete for investors. Firms in industries dominated by dedicated
investors are unlikely to need to use costly disclosure to compete. We use transient investors as
the baseline. We create two industry-quarter variables for the percentages of firms in a two-digit
SIC industry-quarter whose proportions of dedicated (DED) and quasi-indexer (QIX) institutional
holdings are higher than the corresponding full sample medians.19
The last two cross-sectional covariates focus on institutional investors. The models that predict
category learning and investing as an optimal choice (Peng and Xiong, 2006; Van Nieuwerburgh and
Veldkamp, 2010) predict that investors with greater information processing capacity (i.e., less con-
strained) will engage in specialized information acquisition about common risk factors and allocate
more wealth to the “learning” portfolio. Assuming institutions are less constrained than individ-
ual investors, institutions should engage in sector investing and choose among assets in the sector.
More constrained investors should focus on generalized learning and invest in the market portfolio.
Prior empirical evidence also suggests that firms compete for the attention of institutional investors
(Bushee and Noe, 2000).
Table 6 columns (5) and (6) present results using Guide and Capex Fcst as the dependent
variables. The coefficient estimate on the interaction between DED and Comove is negative and
significant. This finding is consistent with the proposition that guidance would not be an effective
tool to compete for investors when the industry is exposed to higher levels of dedicated investors.
In such cases, the costs of disclosure would outweigh the benefits.20 The coefficient estimate on the
interaction term of Comove with a measure of exposure to quasi-indexers, in contrast, is positive
19We thank Brian Bushee for making the institution classification data available on his website:
http://acct.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/bushee/IIclass.html).
20The main effect of Comove is negative in column (6). This coefficient represents the case in which the proportion
of dedicated investors in the industry (% High DED) equals 0.
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and significant. This variable represents industry-quarters in which quasi-indexers were trading
more heavily in the sector, and quasi-indexers are more likely to be category investors that choose
among substitutable securities in a sector.
Overall, the evidence in Table 6 suggests that the response of firm guidance to sector crowdedness
increases in periods when the firms’ exposures to competition for investors are predicted to be the
highest.
5 Results: Disclosure Consequences
Our first analysis examines the joint effects of sector crowdedness and guidance on three proxies
for firm liquidity. The effect of management guidance on liquidity is well documented, but our
evidence now shows that disclosure is endogenously related to sector crowdedness, measured by
firm-sector comovement. If return comovement is related to liquidity, then our finding raises a
question about a form of reverse causality in the documented disclosure-liquidity relation. Prior
literature has linked return synchronicity to liquidity, both theoretically and empirically, suggesting
that higher return synchronicity makes the price of an asset less sensitive to its own order flows and
attracts both liquidity and informed traders (Chan et al., 2013; Baruch et al., 2007). In other words,
return synchronicity begets liquidity. Thus, one reason for examining the direct relation between
comovement and liquidity is to estimate whether the comovement-liquidity relation partially explains
the disclosure-liquidity relation.
The analysis also recognizes that information asymmetry reduction and competition for investors
are not mutually exclusive motives for disclosure choice. The FH model predicts excessive disclosure
– more than is socially optimal – when firms compete for limited investor resources, but the disclosure
nonetheless increases precision. Since our findings in the first part of the paper suggest that more of
the guidance in crowded sectors is issued for investor-seeking purposes, we predict that the impact
of disclosure on liquidity will decrease as sector crowdedness increases. In summary, we expect that
sector crowdedness has a direct effect on liquidity, consistent with prior literature (Chan et al.,
2013). We also expect that guidance has a direct effect on liquidity, as documented in the prior
literature and consistent with theory (e.g. Diamond, 1985; Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991). Our
analysis will determine whether either of these effects – disclosure or crowdedness – subsumes the
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other and whether the effect of crowdedness moderates the previously documented effect of guidance
on liquidity. The moderation prediction is important because it is unique to our proposition that
firms disclose to compete for investors. The information asymmetry reduction proposition does not
predict a marginally decreasing effect of guidance on liquidity as sector crowdedness increases.
We model liquidity as follows:
Liquidityiq = β0 + β1Comoveiq−1 + β2Guideiq−1 + Γ′cControls+ ηiq, (2)
where Liquidityiq represents one of three liquidity measures for firm i in quarter q described below,
and Guideiq−1 equals one if a firm provided a forecast in quarter q − 1 and zero otherwise. We
estimate the model with only Comove and Guide, each with a one quarter lag. We also estimate
the model with these main effects plus an interaction term between Guide and Comove. Γc is a
vector of coefficient estimates on the control variables. Following prior studies on liquidity (Leuz
and Verrecchia, 2000; Balakrishnan et al., 2014), we control for firm size, return volatility, S&P 500
membership, and institutional ownership. We also control for firm stock price because similarly
priced stocks tend to move together (Green and Hwang, 2009) and the level of stock price can also
affect liquidity (Heflin et al., 2005). In all specifications, we add firm and calendar year-quarter
fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
The three measures of liquidity are the percentage of zero return days out of all trading days with
positive trading volume, bid-ask spread, and the price impact of trade (Amihud, 2002). Because
these variables are highly skewed, we take the natural logarithm of one plus the variable. We then
multiply them by minus one so that higher values indicate higher liquidity.
[Insert Table 7]
Table 7 Panel A presents estimates of the main effects of Comove and Guide. Firm-sector
comovement and management forecasts both have positive effects on liquidity, which confirm the
results from studies of disclosure and liquidity and studies of return synchronicity and liquidity (e.g.
Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Chan et al., 2013). When both Comove and Guide are included in the
regression, the coefficient estimates for each variable are similar to those when they are separately
included in the model. The effects of disclosure and sector crowdedness on liquidity do not subsume
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each other.21
Table 8 presents our tests for the marginal effects of guidance on liquidity conditional on sector
crowdedness. Across all three measures of liquidity, the effects of guidance on disclosure decrease
as sector crowdedness increases. The economic effect is large. Using the estimates in column (3),
which controls for firm fixed effects, the marginal effect of issuing a management forecast on bid
ask spread is 0.053-0.093*0.408=0.015 when Comove is at the 75th percentile, a relatively small
effect compared with the full sample mean for bid ask spread of -0.432.22 In contrast, the marginal
effect of issuing a management forecast is 0.050 when Comove is at the 25th percentile, a much
larger effect than that when Comove is at the 75th percencile. Similar results hold for the marginal
effects of issuing capex forecasts and for using other liquidity measures as the outcome variable.
The results confirm the interpretation of our main result that firms disclose to compete for investors
at levels that go beyond the effects of disclosure on information asymmetry.
[Insert Table 8]
The final analysis examines a second predicted consequence of increasing disclosure – greater
price efficiency. In the model of Fishman and Hagerty (1989), more disclosure attracts investors
to study the firm. The resulting decrease in the noise in the firm’s stock price makes stock price
more sensitive to investment, which in turn increases the incentive to invest. Fishman and Hagerty
(1989) therefore predict that disclosure increases investment-price sensitivity.
A higher investment-price sensitivity is also predicted by a learning channel. Studies interpret a
positive association between investment and Tobin’s Q as evidence that management can learn from
an informative stock price.23 This learning channel, although different from the mechanism in the
FH model, similarly predicts that investment-price sensitivity should be higher when price is more
informative. One such study in this literature is Chen et al. (2006), which we have chosen because
they use industry-level return synchronicity as a proxy for price informativeness. They assume that
return synchronicity is negatively associated with price informativeness based on Morck et al. (2000).
As discussed previously, subsequent studies have questioned the validity of return synchronicity as
21In untabulated analysis, we repeat the estimations excluding firm fixed effects. Excluding fixed effects significantly
increases the coefficient estimates, particularly for the effect of management forecasts on liquidity. The results suggest
that the effect of management forecasts on liquidity is mainly cross-sectional rather than time-varying. In contrast,
sector crowdedness is an important driver of both within-firm and cross-sectional liquidity, which is consistent with
the time variation noted in Table 3.
22Recall that the mean bid ask spread is negative because we transform the raw bid ask spread using −log(1 + x).
23See Bond et al. (2012) for a discussion of this literature.
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a proxy for a weaker information environment (e.g., Li et al., 2014) and have found mixed evidence
on the relation between return synchronicity and information environment characteristics. Our
sample period starts after the sample period in Chen et al. (2006) ends. In addition, our firm-
sector comovement measure (Comove) is different from their R2 measure, which is based on a
two-factor market model that includes an industry factor. Nonetheless, their empirical model is a
useful starting point for our analysis.
Chen et al. (2006) regress capital expenditures (and other proxies for investment) on Tobin’s
Q, conditional on return synchronicity as a price informativeness, and find that investment-price
sensitivity is negatively associated with return synchronicity in their sample period. They interpret
this result as evidence that greater price informativeness implies greater investment efficiency. The
findings in Chen et al. (2006) are provocative given our finding that comovement, as a proxy
for correlated fundamentals, is associated with guidance. The combination of findings raises the
question of whether firms with high firm-sector comovement can mitigate price inefficiency through
voluntary disclosure.
We follow the specification in Chen et al. (2006), but we replace return synchronicity with firm-
sector comovement (Comove), and we add a main effect of guidance and an interaction between
Guide and Tobin’s Q.
Capexit = α0 + α1Qit−1 + α2Qit−1XGuideit−1 + α3Guideit−1 + Γ′cControls+ ηit,
where Capexit is capital expenditures of firm i in year t divided by beginning-of-year assets,
Qit−1 is firm i’s Tobin’s Q in year t − 1, defined as the market value of equity (price times shares
outstanding) plus book value of debt, scaled by book assets, and Guideit−1 is an indicator for
issuance of a management forecast or capital expenditure forecast in year t − 1. The control vari-
ables follow Chen et al. (2006) and include: 1/Assetsit−1, CFit, and RET3it. The reciprocal of
firm assets is included because Capexit and Qit−1 are both scaled by book assets. Cash flow is
included to ensure that the results do not simply capture cash-flow-investment sensitivity. The
variable CFi,t is allowed to vary with management forecast decisions (Guideit−1) and firm-sector
comovement (Comoveit−1). Finally, RET3i,t, the stock return of the next three years, captures the
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possibility that investment increases with expected equity over-valuation. The definitions of the
control variables are in Table A1.
The coefficient of interest is α2. We expect that firm investment decisions (Capex) in year t
are more sensitive to stock price when management provided a capital expenditure forecast in year
t− 1, that is, α2 > 0.
[Insert Table 9]
Table 9 demonstrates that providing a capital expenditure forecast increases price efficiency.
Column (1) shows that investment-price sensitivity increases by 0.003 when a capital expenditure
forecast is provided relative to the baseline of 0.006 absent a capital expenditure forecast. In column
(2), the interaction term between Guide and Q is both economically and statistically insignificant.
The combination of results suggests that, in the case of learning from stock price about firm invest-
ment, providing capex guidance improves price efficiency but other forms of guidance do not.
We next extend the analysis to consider the effects of guidance on price efficiency, conditional on
sector crowdedness, as was done in the liquidity tests. We predict that the marginal effect of capital
expenditure forecasts on price efficiency decreases as firm-sector comovement increases. To test this
prediction, we should interact Qit−1XGuideit−1 with Comoveit−1. Because the triple interaction is
difficult to interpret, we estimate the model separately for high and low comovement subsamples,
where a high comovement firm-quarter observation is measured relative to the full-sample median.
Our results are robust to the triple interaction.
[Insert Table 10]
Table 10 shows that price efficiency is higher for both the high and low comovement subsamples
when management provides a capital expenditure forecast. While the baseline investment-price
sensitivity (α1) is similar for the two subsamples (0.006 and 0.007), the magnitude of the interaction
term is significantly higher both statistically and economically when firm-sector comovement is low.
This pattern indicates that the marginal effect of disclosure on informativess, and hence price
efficiency, decreases with sector crowdedness. This finding is consistent with the prediction that a
disclosure in a high comovement-sector is more likely to be serving the dual roles of information
asymmetry reduction and investor-seeking.
29
Overall, we find that the marginal benefit of disclosure on liquidity and price efficiency declines
with firm-sector comovement. When disclosure plays both an information role and an investor-
seeking role, as is the case in a crowded sector, there are diminishing marginal returns to disclosure.
Studies that consider only the informational role for disclosure do not predict that the marginal
benefit of disclosure declines with sector crowdedness. The information role and investor-seeking
roles are not mutually exclusive. The results in Table 7 and 9 clearly demonstrate a main effect of
disclosure on liquidity and price efficiency, but the declining marginal effect suggests that investor-
seeking is an additional factor that motivates disclosure.
6 Conclusion
This paper examines the effect of being in a crowded sector with highly substitutable assets
on firms’ disclosure decisions. Using a firm’s comovement with the firm’s industry returns as our
proxy for substitutability and sector crowdedness, we find that firms are more likely to provide
management forecasts as the sector becomes more crowded. Our results are consistent with the
prediction of Fishman and Hagerty (1989). FH show that when firms have incentives for price
efficiency and traders have limited information processing resources and can study disclosures by
only a subset of firms as in Merton (1987), firms will compete for investors by increasing disclosure.
The effects of crowded sectors on disclosure are stronger for capital expenditure forecasts than
for earnings related forecasts, presumably because these forecasts provide more firm-specific in-
formation that would lead to profitable trade. In addition, the effects of sector crowdedness on
guidance are stronger for firms and in industries that have the strongest incentives for differentia-
tion. Furthermore, when sectors are crowded, management forecasts have smaller effects on liquidity
and price efficiency. The disclosures improve liquidity and price efficiency, which is consistent with
an informational role for the disclosures, but the reduction is smaller than in less crowded sectors,
which is consistent with disclosures by firms in crowded sectors also playing an investor-seeking role.
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Figure 1: Distribution of Firm-sector Comovement across Industries
This figure presents the average firm-sector comovement for one-digit SIC industries. Firm-sector
comovement is the natural logarithm of 1 + R
2
1−R2 , where R
2 values are from the following firm-
quarter-specific regressions of firm i’s daily stock returns in quarter q on the corresponding value
weighted returns of firm i’s two-digit SIC industry, excluding firm i’s own stock returns: Retiqt =
αiq + βiq,−1IndRetjqt−1 + βiq,0IndRetjqt + βiq1IndRetjqt+1 + iqt. The regression requires 50
daily stock return observations. When the estimated R2 is negative, it is replaced with zero in
the calculation.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
This table reports descriptive statistics for the key variables of our empirical analysis. Firm-sector comove-
ment (Comove) is the natural logarithm of 1 + R
2
1−R2 , where R
2 is the adjusted R2 from firm-year-quarter
specific regressions of firm returns on value-weighted two-digit-SIC industry returns. Variable definitions
are reported in Table A1. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentiles. Panels A-D,
respectively, report summary statistics for the main variables (firm-sector comovement and management
forecasts); raw control variables; industry-by-year-adjusted control variables; and cross-sectional variables,
all measured quarterly. Panel E reports the price efficiency variables, measured annually.
Panel A: Main variables
N Mean SD p1 p25 p50 p75 p99
Comove 183934 0.281 0.333 0.000 0.033 0.167 0.408 1.498
Guide 183934 0.488 0.500 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
Num Guide 183934 0.667 0.775 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.386 2.485
Capex Fcst 183934 0.204 0.403 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Num Capex Fcst 183934 0.158 0.321 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.099
EPS Fcst 183934 0.338 0.473 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
Sales Fcst 183934 0.314 0.464 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
Short Horizon 183934 0.330 0.470 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
Long Horizon 183934 0.027 0.163 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Num Fcst Types 183934 0.558 0.615 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.099 1.792
Zero Return 183934 −0.040 0.065 −0.334 −0.047 −0.016 0.000 0.000
Spread 183934 −0.432 0.509 −2.177 −0.615 −0.199 −0.085 −0.014
Amihud 183934 −3.063 2.798 −11.162 −4.768 −2.233 −0.709 −0.030
Panel B: Raw control variables
N Mean SD p1 p25 p50 p75 p99
ROA 183934 0.002 0.060 −0.258 −0.007 0.015 0.031 0.117
Ret Vol 183934 0.032 0.019 0.009 0.019 0.027 0.039 0.114
Analyst Following 183934 6.627 7.496 0.000 1.000 4.000 10.000 32.000
Inst Holdings 183934 0.500 0.321 0.000 0.197 0.540 0.783 1.000
Size 183934 6.128 2.053 2.075 4.613 6.045 7.534 11.148
Leverage 183934 0.198 0.208 0.000 0.002 0.148 0.317 0.924
Market to Book 183934 2.099 1.600 0.560 1.143 1.573 2.408 9.964
Loss 183934 0.349 0.477 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
Earnings Surprise 183934 0.001 0.073 −0.362 −0.007 0.000 0.007 0.382
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Panel C: Industry-adjusted control variables
N Mean SD p1 p25 p50 p75 p99
ROA 183934 0.000 0.056 −0.224 −0.014 0.007 0.028 0.110
Ret Vol 183934 0.000 0.017 −0.030 −0.011 −0.004 0.006 0.064
Analyst Following 183934 0.192 7.141 −10.389 −4.758 −1.784 3.264 24.178
Inst Holdings 183934 0.017 0.307 −0.549 −0.263 0.056 0.277 0.548
Size 183934 −0.012 1.914 −3.940 −1.337 −0.101 1.229 4.852
Leverage 183934 0.000 0.193 −0.296 −0.137 −0.048 0.102 0.649
Market to Book 183934 −0.001 1.507 −1.994 −0.829 −0.354 0.306 6.941
Loss 183934 −0.002 0.457 −0.604 −0.346 −0.221 0.499 0.833
Earnings Surprise 183934 0.000 0.073 −0.348 −0.009 −0.001 0.008 0.365
Panel D: Cross-sectional variables
N Mean SD p1 p25 p50 p75 p99
Not S&P 500 183934 0.899 0.302 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Inst SD 183934 0.124 0.072 0.001 0.070 0.121 0.164 0.328
% High Comove 183934 0.499 0.196 0.100 0.355 0.482 0.643 0.920
High Comove SIC 183934 0.175 0.380 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
% High DED 171056 0.240 0.173 0.000 0.120 0.164 0.390 0.667
% High QIX 171056 0.560 0.139 0.224 0.500 0.575 0.632 0.897
Panel E: Price efficiency variables
N Mean SD p1 p25 p50 p75 p99
Capex/Assets 48467 0.056 0.073 0.000 0.014 0.032 0.068 0.438
Q 48467 1.958 1.556 0.424 1.064 1.454 2.234 9.669
Comove 48467 0.294 0.353 0.000 0.033 0.170 0.422 1.589
1/Assets 48467 0.011 0.023 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.009 0.142
CF 48467 0.079 0.178 −0.663 0.028 0.093 0.164 0.555
Ret3 48467 0.014 0.815 −1.349 −0.490 −0.064 0.302 3.253
Guide 48467 0.535 0.499 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Capex Fcst 48467 0.276 0.447 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
39
T
ab
le
2:
V
ar
ia
bl
e
M
ea
ns
by
F
ir
m
-s
ec
to
r
C
om
ov
em
en
t
D
ec
ile
T
hi
s
ta
bl
e
re
po
rt
s
th
e
av
er
ag
es
of
ke
y
de
pe
nd
en
t
an
d
in
du
st
ry
-a
dj
us
te
d
co
nt
ro
lv
ar
ia
bl
es
by
fir
m
-s
ec
to
r
co
m
ov
em
en
t
de
ci
le
.
F
ir
m
-s
ec
to
r
co
m
ov
em
en
t
(C
om
ov
e)
is
th
e
na
tu
ra
l
lo
ga
ri
th
m
of
1
+
R
2
1
−R
2
,
w
he
re
R
2
is
th
e
ad
ju
st
ed
R
2
fr
om
fir
m
-y
ea
r-
qu
ar
te
r
sp
ec
ifi
c
re
gr
es
si
on
s
of
fir
m
re
tu
rn
s
on
va
lu
e-
w
ei
gh
te
d
tw
o-
di
gi
t-
SI
C
in
du
st
ry
re
tu
rn
s.
T
he
fir
st
tw
o
de
ci
le
s
ar
e
co
m
bi
ne
d
be
ca
us
e
co
m
ov
em
en
t
eq
ua
ls
ze
ro
fo
r
>
10
pe
rc
en
t
of
th
e
sa
m
pl
e.
V
ar
ia
bl
e
de
fin
it
io
ns
ar
e
re
po
rt
ed
in
T
ab
le
A
1.
C
om
ov
em
en
t
de
ci
le
s
G
ui
de
C
ap
ex
Fc
st
Sa
le
s
Fc
st
E
P
S
Fc
st
Sh
or
t
Lo
ng
Ze
ro
R
et
ur
n
Sp
re
ad
A
m
ih
ud
H
or
iz
on
H
or
iz
on
1
0.
21
8
0.
0
48
0
.1
64
0.
13
9
0
.1
54
0.
00
8
−0
.0
87
−0
.9
20
−5
.8
61
2
0.
3
0
9
0.
08
7
0
.2
20
0.
21
0
0
.2
17
0.
01
3
−0
.0
63
−0
.7
01
−4
.6
80
3
0.
4
0
2
0.
12
5
0
.2
88
0.
28
1
0
.2
79
0.
01
8
−0
.0
45
−0
.5
18
−3
.6
77
4
0.
4
8
6
0.
16
8
0
.3
35
0.
34
9
0
.3
38
0.
02
1
−0
.0
32
−0
.3
66
−2
.8
25
5
0
.5
6
8
0.
21
8
0
.3
84
0.
41
6
0
.3
90
0.
02
9
−0
.0
24
−0
.2
61
−2
.1
89
6
0
.6
23
0.
26
5
0
.4
09
0.
44
9
0
.4
20
0.
03
6
−0
.0
19
−0
.2
05
−1
.8
12
7
0
.6
6
6
0.
30
2
0
.4
24
0.
47
9
0
.4
44
0.
04
0
−0
.0
17
−0
.1
69
−1
.5
26
8
0
.6
84
0.
34
7
0
.4
08
0.
48
1
0
.4
56
0.
04
2
−0
.0
14
−0
.1
47
−1
.3
08
9
0
.7
0
2
0.
42
7
0
.3
41
0.
43
3
0
.4
45
0.
05
9
−0
.0
10
−0
.1
09
−0
.8
95
C
om
ov
em
en
t
de
ci
le
s
R
O
A
R
et
ur
n
A
na
ly
st
In
st
it
ut
io
na
l
E
ar
ni
ng
s
Si
ze
Le
ve
ra
ge
M
ar
ke
t-
Lo
ss
vo
la
ti
lit
y
fo
llo
w
in
g
ow
ne
rs
hi
p
Su
rp
ri
se
to
-B
oo
k
1
−0
.0
20
0
.0
07
−4
.0
14
−0
.2
05
0
.0
01
−1
.4
90
−0
.0
16
−0
.1
89
0.
14
5
2
−0
.0
14
0
.0
05
−2
.8
56
−0
.1
22
0
.0
00
−0
.9
93
−0
.0
10
−0
.0
55
0.
10
5
3
−0
.0
07
0
.0
02
−1
.5
79
−0
.0
45
0
.0
00
−0
.5
01
−0
.0
05
−0
.0
14
0.
05
5
4
0
.0
00
−0
.0
01
−0
.3
83
0
.0
33
−0
.0
01
−0
.0
69
−0
.0
01
0.
04
3
0.
00
8
5
0
.0
06
−0
.0
03
0
.8
06
0
.0
87
0
.0
00
0
.3
49
0
.0
04
0.
08
3
−0
.0
37
6
0
.0
1
0
−0
.0
0
4
1
.7
22
0
.1
27
0
.0
00
0
.6
16
0
.0
12
0.
09
7
−0
.0
72
7
0
.0
13
−0
.0
05
2
.7
92
0
.1
51
−0
.0
01
0
.8
75
0
.0
13
0.
10
3
−0
.0
97
8
0
.0
1
4
−0
.0
0
5
3
.7
69
0
.1
63
−0
.0
01
1
.0
92
0
.0
12
0.
09
1
−0
.1
23
9
0
.0
1
6
−0
.0
0
4
5
.6
75
0
.1
82
−0
.0
02
1
.4
93
0
.0
07
0.
01
4
−0
.1
54
40
Table 3: Firm-sector Comovement Transition Matrix
This table reports the q − 1 to q transition matrix for firm-sector comovement. Firm-sector co-
movement (Comove) is the natural logarithm of 1 + R
2
1−R2 , where R
2 is the adjusted R2 from
firm-year-quarter specific regressions of firm returns on value-weighted two-digit-SIC industry re-
turns. The columns represent comovement deciles of quarter q and the rows represent comovement
deciles of quarter q−1. Each cell contains (1) the number of observations that belong to a particular
comovement decile combination (top), and (2) the percentage of observations that belong to a par-
ticular comovement decile in quarter q among observations that belong to a particular comovement
decile in quarter q − 1 (bottom). The sum of the percentages in each row add up to 100%. The
first two deciles are combined because firm-sector comovement equals zero for > 10 percent of the
sample.
q-1
q 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Total
1 20,173 7,175 4,537 2,410 1,276 673 347 148 35 36,774
54.86 19.51 12.34 6.55 3.47 1.83 0.94 0.4 0.1 100
2 7,281 3,347 2,634 1,943 1,401 914 522 264 82 18,388
39.6 18.2 14.32 10.57 7.62 4.97 2.84 1.44 0.45 100
3 4,574 2,672 2,828 2,558 2,132 1,627 1,154 649 194 18,388
24.87 14.53 15.38 13.91 11.59 8.85 6.28 3.53 1.06 100
4 2,354 2,003 2,546 2,889 2,718 2,408 1,840 1,182 449 18,389
12.8 10.89 13.85 15.71 14.78 13.09 10.01 6.43 2.44 100
5 1,228 1,371 2,171 2,743 2,990 2,835 2,498 1,753 798 18,387
6.68 7.46 11.81 14.92 16.26 15.42 13.59 9.53 4.34 100
6 646 914 1,686 2,444 2,809 3,023 3,025 2,529 1,312 18,388
3.51 4.97 9.17 13.29 15.28 16.44 16.45 13.75 7.14 100
7 337 542 1,144 1,833 2,581 3,068 3,468 3,285 2,130 18,388
1.83 2.95 6.22 9.97 14.04 16.68 18.86 17.86 11.58 100
8 145 296 648 1,149 1,796 2,509 3,387 4,493 3,964 18,387
0.79 1.61 3.52 6.25 9.77 13.65 18.42 24.44 21.56 100
9 37 68 194 419 684 1,331 2,147 4,085 9,424 18,389
0.2 0.37 1.05 2.28 3.72 7.24 11.68 22.21 51.25 100
Total 36,775 18,388 18,388 18,388 18,387 18,388 18,388 18,388 18,388 183,878
20 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 100
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Table 4: The Effect of Firm-sector Comovement on Management Guidance
This table reports the coefficients of OLS regressions of management forecast decisions on firm-sector co-
movement for the following specification:
Guideiq = β0 + β1Comoveiq−1 + Γ′cControls+ ηiq
In Panel A, the dependent variable is an indicator for the existence of a management forecast in quarter q
for columns (1) through (4), and the log number of management forecasts in the quarter in column (5). In
Panel B, the dependent variable is an indicator for the existence of a capital expenditure forecast in quarter
q for columns (1) through (4), and the log number of capital expenditure forecast in quarter q in column
(5). In Panel C, the dependent variable is an indicator for the existence of an EPS forecast in column (1),
an indicator for the existence of a sales forecast in column (2), an indicator for the existence of a forecast for
the next quarter in column (3), an indicator for the existence of a forecast with horizon longer than a year
in column (4), and the log number of unique types of forecasts in column (5). All independent variables are
lagged by one quarter. Firm-sector comovement (Comove) is the natural logarithm of 1 + R
2
1−R2 , where R
2 is
the adjusted R2 from firm-year-quarter specific regressions of firm returns on value-weighted two-digit-SIC
industry returns. Control variable are industry-by-year adjusted. All variables are defined in Table A1.
Standard errors, reported in brackets, are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Within R2 is reported for fixed effect regressions.
Panel A: General management forecast
VARIABLES Guide Guide Guide Guide Num
Guide
Comoveiq−1 0.417*** 0.088*** 0.048*** 0.051*** 0.060***
[0.003] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.008]
Control variables:
ROAiq−1 0.242*** 0.261*** 0.422***
[0.045] [0.044] [0.063]
Lossiq−1 −0.031*** −0.031*** −0.054***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.005]
Return volatilityiq−1 −0.432*** −0.456*** −0.831***
[0.088] [0.087] [0.118]
Analyst followingiq−1 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.014***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Inst holdingsiq−1 0.092*** 0.092*** 0.174***
[0.014] [0.014] [0.022]
Sizeiq−1 0.051*** 0.046*** 0.067***
[0.006] [0.005] [0.008]
Leverageiq−1 0.022 0.022 0.026
[0.016] [0.016] [0.024]
Market-to-Bookiq−1 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.015***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.003]
Earnings Surpriseiq−1 0.034*** 0.037*** 0.057***
[0.010] [0.010] [0.013]
Constant 0.370*** 0.519*** 0.126*** 0.561*** 0.788***
[0.001] [0.006] [0.036] [0.008] [0.011]
Industry-adjusted controls No No No Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-quarter Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 183,934 183,934 183,934 183,934 183,934
R2 0.077 0.040 0.061 0.059 0.073
No. of firm clusters 6,948 6,948 6,948 6,948 6,948
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Panel B: Capital expenditures guidance
VARIABLES Capex Fcst Capex Fcst Capex Fcst Capex Fcst Num
Capex Fcst
Comoveiq−1 0.341*** 0.072*** 0.054*** 0.055*** 0.045***
[0.003] [0.006] [0.005] [0.005] [0.004]
Control variables:
ROAiq−1 −0.052 −0.023 −0.026
[0.032] [0.032] [0.026]
Lossiq−1 −0.006* −0.009*** −0.006***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.002]
Return volatilityiq−1 0.281*** 0.081 0.058
[0.069] [0.067] [0.053]
Analyst followingiq−1 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.005***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Inst holdingsiq−1 0.037*** 0.029** 0.018*
[0.013] [0.013] [0.010]
Sizeiq−1 0.022*** 0.025*** 0.021***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.004]
Leverageiq−1 0.020 0.023 0.018
[0.015] [0.015] [0.012]
Market-to-Bookiq−1 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Earnings Surpriseiq−1 −0.014 −0.007 −0.008
[0.009] [0.009] [0.007]
Constant 0.100*** 0.237*** 0.021 0.254*** 0.198***
[0.001] [0.006] [0.030] [0.007] [0.006]
Industry-adjusted controls No No No Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-quarter Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 183,934 183,934 183,934 183,934 183,934
R2 0.080 0.080 0.087 0.086 0.085
Num of firm clusters 6,948 6,948 6,948 6,948 6,948
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Panel C: Additional guidance measures
VARIABLES EPS Fcst Sales Fcst Short Long Num
Horizon Horizon Fcst Types
Comoveiq−1 0.025*** 0.033*** 0.030*** 0.014*** 0.055***
[0.006] [0.005] [0.005] [0.003] [0.006]
Control variables:
ROAiq−1 0.242*** 0.344*** 0.185*** 0.027** 0.306***
[0.041] [0.041] [0.037] [0.012] [0.050]
Lossiq−1 −0.037*** −0.022*** −0.020*** 0.000 −0.037***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.001] [0.004]
Return volatilityiq−1 −0.642*** −0.494*** −0.367*** 0.015 −0.708***
[0.080] [0.079] [0.075] [0.025] [0.095]
Analyst followingiq−1 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.001*** 0.010***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001]
Inst holdingsiq−1 0.095*** 0.064*** 0.030*** 0.007 0.119***
[0.014] [0.013] [0.012] [0.005] [0.017]
Sizeiq−1 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.031*** 0.004** 0.055***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.002] [0.006]
Leverageiq−1 −0.006 0.025* 0.010 0.004 0.025
[0.016] [0.015] [0.013] [0.005] [0.019]
Market-to-Bookiq−1 0.005*** 0.008*** 0.003* 0.002*** 0.008***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002]
Earnings Surpriseiq−1 0.033*** 0.037*** 0.012 0.005 0.051***
[0.008] [0.008] [0.012] [0.004] [0.011]
Constant 0.388*** 0.368*** 0.467*** 0.019*** 0.675***
[0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.003] [0.009]
Industry-adjusted controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 183,934 183,934 183,934 183,934 183,934
R2 0.024 0.037 0.058 0.018 0.088
No. of firm clusters 6,948 6,948 6,948 6,948 6,948
44
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Table 8: The Effect of Guidance on Liquidity Conditional on Firm-sector Comovement
This table reports the coefficients of the following OLS regression:
Liquidityiq = β0 + β1Comoveiq−1 + β2Guideiq−1 + β3Comove ∗Guideiq−1 + Γ′cControls+ ηiq.
The dependent variable is zero return days for columns (1) and (2), bid-ask spread for columns (3) and (4),
and Amihud illiquidity for columns (5) and (6). All dependent variables are transformed with −log(1+x) to
mitigate skewness and a higher value indicates higher liquidity. Comove is the natural logarithm of 1+ R
2
1−R2 ,
where R2 is the adjusted R2 from firm-year-quarter specific regressions of firm returns on value-weighted
two-digit-SIC industry returns. Guideiq−1 is an indicator for management forecast issuance in columns (1),
(3), and (5), and an indicator for capital expenditure forecast issuance in columns (2), (4), and (6). All
variables are defined in Table A1. Coefficient estimates for the control variables are not tabulated. All
models include firm and year-quarter fixed effects. Standard errors, reported in brackets, are clustered at
the firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Within R2 is reported for fixed effect regressions.
VARIABLES Zero Zero Spread Spread Amihud Amihud
Return Return
Comoveiq−1 0.014∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.756∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗
[0.001] [0.001] [0.006] [0.004] [0.026] [0.018]
Guideiq−1 0.003∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.267∗∗∗
[0.000] [0.004] [0.016]
Comoveiq−1XGuideiq−1 −0.009∗∗∗ −0.093∗∗∗ −0.424∗∗∗
[0.001] [0.006] [0.026]
Capex Fcstiq−1 −0.000 0.034∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗
[0.000] [0.003] [0.015]
Comoveiq−1XCapex Fcstiq−1 −0.003∗∗∗ −0.042∗∗∗ −0.204∗∗∗
[0.001] [0.004] [0.020]
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 183,934 183,934 183,934 183,934 183,934 183,934
R2 0.099 0.099 0.390 0.387 0.473 0.470
No. of firm clusters 6,948 6,948 6,948 6,948 6,948 6,948
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Table 9: Price Efficiency
This table reports the coefficient of the following regression:
Capexit = α0 + α1Qit−1 + α2Qit−1XGuideit−1 + α3Guideit−1 + Γ′cControls+ ηit.
The dependent variable is the capital expenditure of firm i in year t scaled by the beginning-of-year book
value of assets. The independent variable is Qit−1, measured as the market value of equity (price times shares
outstanding) plus book value of assets minus the book value of equity, scaled by book assets. In column
(1), Guideit−1 is an indicator for whether a firm provided a capital expenditure forecast in year t − 1. In
column (2), Guideit−1 is an indicator for whether a firm provided a management forecast in year t− 1. All
models include firm and year fixed effects. Comoveit−1 is the average quarterly firm-sector comovement of
year t− 1. All other variables are defined in Table A1. Standard errors, reported in brackets, are clustered
at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2)
VARIABLES capex capex
Qit−1 0.006∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
[0.000] [0.001]
Qit−1XCapex Fcstit−1 0.003∗∗∗
[0.001]
Qit−1XGuideit−1 −0.000
[0.001]
Control Variables
CFit−1XCapex Fcstit−1 0.046∗∗∗
[0.008]
Capex Fcstit−1 −0.012∗∗∗
[0.002]
CFit−1XGuideit−1 0.018∗∗∗
[0.005]
Guideit−1 −0.004∗∗∗
[0.001]
CFit 0.028∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
[0.004] [0.004]
1/Assetsit−1 0.228∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗
[0.036] [0.036]
Qit−1XComoveit−1 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
[0.001] [0.001]
CFit−1XComoveit−1 0.045∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗
[0.010] [0.010]
Comoveit−1 −0.008∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗
[0.002] [0.002]
RET3it −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗
[0.000] [0.000]
Observations 48,468 48,468
R2 0.678 0.677
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Table 10: Price Efficiency Conditional on Firm-sector Comovement
This table reports the coefficient of the following regression:
Capexit = α0 + α1Qit−1 + α2Qit−1XCapexFcstit−1 + α3CapexFcstit−1 + Γ′cControls+ ηit.
The dependent variable is the capital expenditure of firm i in year t scaled by the beginning-of-year book
value of assets. The independent variable is Qit−1, measured as the market value of equity (price times shares
outstanding) plus book value of assets minus the book value of equity, scaled by book assets. CapexFcstit−1
is an indicator for whether a firm provided a capital expenditure forecast in year t − 1. Comovementit−1
is the average quarterly firm-sector comovement of year t − 1. Column (1) reports results for firm-year
observations with comovement in year t− 1 lower than the full sample median. Column (2) reports results
for firm-year observations with comovement in year t − 1 higher than the full sample median. Coefficient
estimates for the control variables are not tabulated. All models include firm and year fixed effects. All other
variables are defined in Table A1. Standard errors, reported in brackets, are clustered at the firm level. ***,
**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Low Comovement High Comovement
VARIABLES Capex Capex
Qit−1 0.006*** 0.007***
[0.001] [0.001]
Qit−1XCapex Fcstit−1 0.005*** 0.002*
[0.002] [0.001]
Control Variables
CFit−1XCapex Fcstit−1 0.021 0.057***
[0.014] [0.011]
Capex Fcstit−1 −0.015*** −0.010***
[0.003] [0.002]
CFit 0.031*** 0.026***
[0.004] [0.009]
1/Assetsit−1 0.217*** 0.754***
[0.038] [0.194]
Qit−1XComoveit−1 0.005 0.002*
[0.005] [0.001]
CFit−1XComoveit−1 −0.088** 0.057***
[0.042] [0.014]
Comoveit−1 0.008 −0.008***
[0.012] [0.003]
RET3it −0.004*** −0.003***
[0.001] [0.001]
Observations 23,383 23,330
R2 0.643 0.738
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